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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the "Waiver of Subrogation" may be enforced where there was 
no "notice to" or "endorsement" by the parties' insurance carriers, as required by 
f 6.4 of the Lease. This was a ruling made on summary judgment, which is 
reviewed for correctness with no deference afforded the trial court. Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). This issue was raised in 
"Mountain States Steel's Memorandum in Opposition to Voest-Alpine's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment" at RR. 776-75. 
2. Whether the Waiver of Subrogation may be enforced where Voest-
Alpine failed to provide the liability insurance required by |6.1 of the Lease. The 
same standard of review applies as in f 1 above. This issue was also raised in 
Mountain States Steel's Memorandum in Opposition at RR. 777-76. 
3. Whether there is a proper basis for Voest-Alpine's "Amended" 
Judgment for Attorney's Fees and Costs, assuming it gets entered by the trial court. 
Calculation of a reasonable attorney's fee is in the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 
(Utah 1982). This issue was raised in Mountain States' "Objections to Voest-
Alpine's 'Amended' Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law Re: Attorney's Fees; 
Costs" at R. 1057. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On March 4,1994, Alfonso Ramirez and Mark Bakowski fell 40 feet from a 
man basket suspended over a concrete floor. (R. 338 f 1) Both individuals suffered 
serious and permanently disabling injuries when they struck the floor. (R. 7 ^14) 
Both were employees of Voest-Alpine Services & Technologies Corporation 
("Voest-Alpine"). (R. 338 f4) At the time of the accident, they were working on a 
wall at facilities owned by Mountain States Steel, Inc. ("Mountain States"). (R. 
335 f9) 
On January 19, 1994, Voest-Alpine entered into a "Lease" with Mountain 
States (R. 319) by which it rented a portion of the premises (the "North Shop of the 
Complex"). (R. 338 f 2) Ramirez and Bakowski were working on the wall as part 
of the work necessary to prepare the North Shop for Voest-Alpine's occupancy. 
(R. 335 f9) 
The "Term" of the Lease (R. 3191J2.1) began March 1, 1994. At the time of 
the accident, Voest-Alpine was working on its improvements to the North Shop. 
(R. 252/4-22) As permitted by the Lease, (R. 3181J2.3) Voest-Alpine was 
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withholding rent because the leased premises were not available for immediate 
occupancy. (R. 334116) 
Mountain States was responsible for the improvements, which were known 
as "Lessor Improvements." (R. 318 12.3) The Lease provided that if Mountain 
States failed to complete the Lessor Improvements within the time required, Voest-
Alpine was permitted to "perform or cause to be performed any work or 
service...to keep the Lessor Improvements on schedule." (R. 318 12.3) 
Voest-Alpine "loaned" its two employees (Ramirez & Bakowski) to 
Mountain States to accelerate the pace of the Lessor Improvements. (R. 334114) 
At the time of the accident, Ramirez and Bakowski were working under the 
direction and control of Mountain States. The man basket was suspended from a 
crane that was owned by Mountain States and was being operated by a Mountain 
States employee. 
Ramirez never filed action. His claim was settled for $1,182,500 (R. 357 
17) following mediation. Bakowski filed this action against Mountain States, (R. 
10) but his Complaint was never served. Bakowski's claim was settled shortly 
after the mediation for $503,714. (R. 35717) 
The claims were settled by insurers for Mountain States. (R. 334117) 
Pacific Insurance, Ltd. ("Pacific") provided Mountain States with $1 million in 
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primary liability insurance. Century Indemnity Company ("Century," successor to 
Insurance Co. of North America) provided Mountain States with $2 million in 
excess liability insurance. 
Pacific paid its $1 million policy limit to settle Ramirez' claim. (R. 928 15) 
Century paid the remaining $182,500 to settle Ramirez' claim. (R. 927 17) 
Century paid all of the $503,714 to settle Bakowski's claim. (R. 927 f7) Mountain 
States' liability insurers also incurred $58,017.44 in attorney's fees and $2,161.88 
in costs defending Mountain States against the claims by Ramirez and Bakowski. 
(R. 476) 
The Lease (R. 314 16.1) required Voest-Alpine to "obtain and keep in force 
during the term of this lease a policy of combined single limit, bodily injury and 
property damage public liability insurance insuring [Mountain States] and [Voest-
Alpine] against any liability arising out of the ownership, use, occupancy or 
maintenance of the premises and all areas appurtenant thereto." 
The insurance was to be "a combined single limit policy in an amount not 
less than Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00)." (R314f6.1) It was to contain 
"cross liability endorsements." (16.1) However, the limits of insurance were not to 
"limit the liability of [Voest-Alpine] hereunder." (16.1) The insurance was also to 
have "a Lessor's Protective Liability endorsement attached thereto." (16.1) 
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The Lease provided that if "[Voest-Alpine] shall fail to procure and maintain 
the insurance, [Mountain States] may, but shall not be required to, procure and 
maintain the same, but at the expense of [Voest-Alpine], or [Mountain States] may 
declare a material breach of this Lease." (R. 314 [^6.1) 
Voest-Alpine agreed in this case that the liability insurance it was supposed 
to acquire would have covered the incident in this case. (RR. 884-76) 
Based on the foregoing, Mountain States tendered the Ramirez and 
Bakowski claims to Voest-Alpine and its insurers. (R. 479 ^4) However, Voest-
Alpine and its insurers rejected the tender. (RR. 479 f 5) 
Voest-Alpine contended that the Lease Term did not commence until the 
Lessor Improvements were completed. (RR. 333-24) Voest-Alpine's insurers 
contended that liability for the accident did not arise out of Voest-Alpine's 
"ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance of the premises and all areas 
appurtenant thereto." (RR. 468-67) 
Because of the rejection of tender, Mountain States' insurers were required 
to indemnify and defend the loss. However, there was nothing in the Lease 
requiring Mountain States to obtain and keep in force the kind of insurance that 
would indemnify and defend against the loss. 
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Mountain States was required to "obtain and keep in force during the term of 
this lease, a policy or policies of insurance for full replacement value covering loss 
or damage to the premises (excluding [Voest-Alpine's] fixtures, equipment and 
mobile office building)...." (R. 31416.2(a)) 
This was "Property Insurance" (R. 31416.2) rather than "Liability 
Insurance." (16.1) As such, it was to provide "protection against all perils included 
within the classification of fire, extended coverage, vandalism, malicious mischief, 
special extended perils (all risk), and such other insurance as is required by 
mortgagees of the Complex." (16.2(a)) 
Even though Voest-Alpine and its insurers rejected the tender, Mountain 
States continued to insist that they were liable for the accident and apprised them 
of all significant developments in the case. (R. 47916) 
Most importantly, Mountain States notified Voest-Alpine and its insurers of 
the mediation and the possible settlement of the claims. (RR. 465-64) Voest-
Alpine and its insurers were invited to participate in the mediation and negotiation 
of the claims, but they never did. (RR. 465-64) They never inquired of Mountain 
States regarding the status of the claims. (R. 462) 
After the claims were settled, Century and Pacific (in the name of Mountain 
States) filed a Third-Party Complaint against Voest-Alpine for breach of the Lease 
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and indemnification. (R. 48) Century and Pacific filed action to recover amounts 
paid to settle the Ramirez & Bakowski claims, including costs and attorney's fees 
defending Mountain States against the claims. (R. 43) 
Both Century and Pacific and Voest-Alpine filed Motions for Summary 
Judgment, (RR. 156 & 348) which were heard by Judge Maetani of the trial court. 
On June 8, 1998, Judge Maetani made his Memorandum Decision. (R. 458) 
Judge Maetani granted Mountain States' Motion and denied Voest-Alpine's. 
(R. 487) In doing so, Judge Maetani rejected Voest-Alpine's argument about the 
commencement of the Lease Term. Judge Maetani concluded "that Voest-Alpine 
was obligated to have a liability insurance policy in force on March 1, 19[9]4." (R. 
452) 
Voest-Alpine did not present any evidence that it had complied with the 
insurance obligation under the Lease. (R. 356 ^8) Therefore, Judge Maetani also 
determined that Voest-Alpine was in breach of ^[6.1: "Voest-Alpine did not 
procure insurance, as required by paragraph 6 of the Lease. Inasmuch as the 
Bakowski/Ramirez accident arose out of the ownership, use and occupancy of the 
premises, the required insurance would have provided coverage to Mountain States 
for the Bakowski/Ramirez accident." (R. 455 f 18) 
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Judge Maetani noted that "[t]he remaining issues of the amount of damages 
are left unaffected by this decision." (R. 452) Accordingly, both parties filed 
Second Motions for Summary Judgment. (RR. 461 & 491) In its Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Voest-Alpine contended that it did not breach the Lease 
because it provided the insurance required by TJ6.1. (RR. 733-32) Voest-Alpine 
also contended that the "Waiver of Subrogation" barred the third-party action. (RR. 
731-24) 
The Motions were heard by Judge Taylor of the trial court who ruled from 
the bench. (R. 948) Judge Taylor held that "the strict language of the contract 
compels the Court to conclude that where there is any insurance that covers the 
loss, the parties will not seek further damages." (R. 948) 
On June 5, 2000, Judge Taylor entered "Findings of Facts, Conclusions of 
Law and Order Granting Defendant Voest-Alpine Service's Motion for Summary 
Judgment." (R. 955)1 
Judge Taylor did not reach the issue whether Voest-Alpine provided the 
insurance required by ^6.1. (R. 952 f 16) He concluded that Mountain States' 
1
 Both parties were mistaken about the date of entry. Voest-Alpine's "Notice of Entry of Judgment" (R. 957) stated 
that the date was "June 6, 2000." The undersigned confirmed this with the clerk of the trial court. Based on this, 
Mountain States filed its Notice of Appeal on July 6, 2000. (R. 1022) However, the time for filing the appeal was 
actually extended by Voest-Alpine's Motion for Attorney's Fees, which was not decided until after Mountain States 
filed its Notice of Appeal. See ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4,1flfl4,l5, 998 P.2d 254. 
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third-party action was barred by |6.4 of the Lease. (R. 952 f 18) Accordingly, he 
granted Voest-Alpine's Motion and dismissed the third-party action. (R. 950 fflfA, 
B & C ) 
On June 19, 2000, Voest-Alpine served a "Motion for Attorney's Fees." (R. 
959) The Motion was supported by a "Memorandum," (R. 1015) which totaled the 
fees for Voest-Alpine's Salt Lake City law firm as $30,206.45. (R. 1013) The fees 
for Voest-Alpine's Pittsburgh law firm were totaled as $23,637.50. (R. 1013) 
Mountain States filed a "Memorandum in Opposition" (R. 1027) objecting 
to the "reasonableness" of the total fees. (RR. 1025-24) 
On September 11, 2000, Judge Taylor made a "Memorandum Decision re: 
Attorney's Fees." (R. 1052) Judge Taylor granted Voest-Alpine's Motion, but 
only awarded $30,206.45 in fees, (R. 1049) the amount represented for Voest-
Alpine's Salt Lake City law firm. Judge Taylor found that this amount represented 
a "reasonable fee." (R. 1050) 
As directed by the trial court, Voest-Alpine served a "Judgment for Third-
Party Defendant Voest-Alpine's Attorney's Fees." There was no objection from 
Mountain States, but Voest-Alpine did not file the Judgment with the trial court, 
and it has not been entered. 
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Voest-Alpine replaced it with an "Amended" Judgment for Attorney's Fees. 
As it turned out, the "Affidavit" that Voest-Alpine filed in support of its Motion, 
(R. 1011) actually totaled the fees of the Salt Lake City law firm at $38,380.00. 
(RR. 1009-969) It also totaled $4,870.33 in "costs." 
Therefore, the Amended Judgment was for an amount $13,043.88 higher 
than that awarded by Judge Taylor. It also included an award of costs or legal 
expenses that was no part of Voest-Alpine's claim or Judge Taylor's ruling. 
As a result, Mountain States filed "Objections" to the Amended Judgment. 
(R. 1057) Voest-Alpine filed a "Memorandum in Opposition to Mountain States 
Steel's Objections." (R. 1074) 
Mountain States' Objections to the Amended Judgment are at issue but have 
not been decided by the trial court. Mountain States is not appealing the 
$30,206.45 award of attorney's fees. (R. 1052) However, it does intend to appeal 
the Amended Judgment, assuming it gets entered by the trial court. 
Since neither Mountain States' "Memorandum in Reply" nor Voest-Alpine's 
Amended Judgment appears in the record of the case, Mountain States requests, 
pursuant to URAP 11(h), to modify the record to include both said documents 
(Addenda hereto). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Paragraph 6.4 of the Lease required "notice to" and "endorsements" 
from the parties' insurance carriers recognizing the waiver of subrogation. There 
was no evidence of "notice" to the parties' insurance carriers. There were certainly 
no "endorsements" recognizing the waiver of subrogation. Without notice and an 
endorsement, Mountain States' insurance carriers are free to pursue this 
subrogation action. 
2. The Lease provided that the parties would look exclusively to the 
insurance each was required to provide. The "Waiver of Subrogation" was 
dependent on this mutual insurance requirement. The purpose behind the Waiver 
of Subrogation would not be served by permitting Voest-Alpine to avoid its 
insurance obligation simply because Mountain States obtained liability insurance 
of its own. 
3. The trial court awarded $30,206.45 in attorney's fees. In doing so, the 
court found that to be a "reasonable fee." There is no basis for Voest-Alpine's 
claim to an additional $13,043.88 in the Amended Judgment. There is no basis for 
Voest-Alpine's claim to costs or legal expenses. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. MOUNTAIN STATES' INSURANCE CARRIERS HAD NO NOTICE 
OF AND NEVER ENDORSED THE "WAIVER OF SUBROGATION" 
AND ARE THEREFORE FREE TO PURSUE THIS ACTION. 
Paragraph 6.4 of the Lease ("Waiver of Subrogation") provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
[Voest-Alpine] and [Mountain States] each waive any and all 
rights of recovery against the other, or against the officers, employees, 
agents and representatives of the other, for loss of or damage to such 
waiving party...where such loss or damage is insured against under 
any insurance policy in force at the time of such loss or damage. 
[Voest-Alpine] and [Mountain States] shall, upon obtaining the 
policies of insurance required hereunder, give notice to the insurance 
carrier or carriers that the foregoing mutual waiver of subrogation is 
contained in this lease, and shall obtain endorsements to the respective 
policies recognizing the waiver. 
Voest-Alpine seized on the word "any" in the first sentence of f 6.4 and 
argued that this barred the subrogation action by Mountain States' insurance 
carriers. However, the first sentence of f 6.4 says nothing about "subrogation" or 
"insurance carriers." All it says is that Mountain States waived "any and all rights 
or recovery" against Voest-Alpine "where such loss or damage is insured against 
under any insurance policy in force at the time of such loss or damage." 
That is where the second sentence of f 6.4 comes in. It actually 
ensures a waiver of subrogation by requiring "notice to the insurance carrier 
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or carriers that the foregoing mutual waiver of subrogation is contained in this 
lease" and also "endorsements to the respective policies recognizing the waiver [of 
subrogation]." Otherwise, the insurance carrier or carriers would be free to pursue 
subrogation actions against the parties. 
It is obvious that the two sentences must be read together. They are both in 
the same paragraph titled "Waiver of Subrogation." There is language in the 
second sentence specifically tying the sentences together: "Lessee and Lessor 
shall,...give notice to the insurance carrier or carriers that the foregoing mutual 
waiver of subrogation is contained in this lease,...." 
Voest-Alpine is sure to argue that the first sentence of {^6.4 is enough to 
accomplish a waiver of subrogation that would bind the insurance carriers. If that 
were true, there would be no need for the second sentence. Under ordinary rules of 
contract interpretation, the Court should read the contract "so as to harmonize all 
of its provisions and all of its terms, which terms should be given effect if it is 
possible to do so." LDSHospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 
(Utah 1988). 
Since the right of subrogation arises for the benefit of the insurer, it is certain 
that the insurer may waive that right. 16 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 61:15, p. 89. 
However, waiver of subrogation is no different than waiver in other cases, which 
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requires a "knowing relinquishment of a known right." Jenkins v. Percival, 1998 
UT 16022, 962 P.2d 796, 799. 
As a result, insurers have prevailed in the face of waiver of subrogation 
clauses where it was shown that they did not receive "notice" of the clause. 
Continental Insurance Co. v. Washeon Corp., 524 F. Supp. 34, 36 (D. Mo. 1981); 
and Alamo Chemical Transportation Co. v. M/V Overseas Vaides, 469 F. Supp. 
203,212(E.D.La. 1979). 
More to the point, where the parties' contract requires the written agreement 
of the insurers, the waiver of subrogation is ineffective without it. Harlington 
Realty Corp. v. S.L.G. Discount Corp., 556 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 
1990)("the lease provided for mutual release and waiver of the right of subrogation 
by either parties' insurer only if each party's insurance policy contained a clause 
providing that such a release or waiver would not invalidate the policy or increase 
its premiums.... Accordingly, there was no valid mutual release and waiver of the 
right to subrogation, and plaintiffs insurer was thus entitled to maintain this 
claim"). 
At the very least, Mountain States would be entitled to "indemnification" for 
Voest-Alpine's failure to provide the waiver of subrogation endorsement required 
by the Lease. In re: Admiral Towing Barge Co., 767 F.2d 243, 251 (5th Cir. 
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1985)("Intermodal was unable to obtain Protection] and Indemnity] insurance 
with a waiver of subrogation against the tug or its owner. The district court 
therefore properly allowed Admiral Towing indemnification against the Seatrain 
entities, in the event of future claims by cargo, for their failure to hold Admiral 
Towing harmless from liability to cargo"). 
Voest-Alpine is sure to argue that the carriers are barred by the general 
equitable principle that because an insurer stands in the shoes of its insured, "any 
defenses that are valid against the insured are also valid against the insurer." E.g., 
Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah App. 1989). 
However, the general principle holds no sway (nor should it) in the face of express 
contractual language to the contrary. 
In this case, it is undisputed that Mountain States' liability insurance carriers 
did not endorse the waiver of subrogation in the Lease. (R. 776 n.6) There is 
certainly no evidence in the record that they did. There is no evidence that they 
received notice of the waiver of subrogation. Therefore, under the plain language 
of the Lease, f 6.4 does not bar the subrogation claims of Mountain States' liability 
insurance carriers. 
2
 Voest-Alpine did not deny the contention. (RR. 887-86). In case there were any doubt, Mountain States offers, pursuant 
to URAP 11(h), to modify the record by producing each of the insurance policies in question. 
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II. PARAGRAPH 6.4 OF THE LEASE ONLY APPLIES TO 
INSURANCE "REQUIRED" BY THE LEASE. 
"Insurance" is the subject of 16 of the Lease. "Liability Insurance" is the 
subject of 16.1. It is clear that Voest-Alpine had the obligation to provide liability 
insurance under 16.1. There is no mention of Mountain States providing liability 
insurance. Therefore, it is obvious that the Lease contemplated that the parties 
would look exclusively to liability insurance provided by Voest-Alpine. 
There is nothing in the Lease expressly contemplating the parties getting 
insurance not required by the Lease. Voest-Alpine argues that the word "any" in 
the first sentence of [^6.4 should be so construed. However, it is easy to see why 
Voest-Alpine's interpretation makes no sense. 
There is nothing in f 6.4 requiring the parties to "give notice to" or "obtain 
endorsements" from insurance carriers other than those providing the insurance 
required by 16. This is made plain by the language in the second sentence of 16.4: 
"Lessee and Lessor shall, upon obtaining the policies of insurance required 
hereunder, give notice to the insurance carrier or carriers that the foregoing mutual 
waiver of subrogation is contained in this lease,...." 
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Voest-Alpine's construction of f 6.4 avails it nothing since the party 
obtaining insurance not required by the Lease would not be required to obtain a 
waiver of subrogation endorsement from the insurance carriers. 
Neither of the two principal cases relied upon by Voest-Alpine in the court 
below involved a true subrogation action by an insurer. Touchet Valley Grain 
Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold General Construction, Inc., 831 P.2d 724 (Wash. 
1992) involved a "loan receipt" arrangement by which the insurer did not make 
any payments under the policy. 831 P.2d at 727. Town ofSilverton v. Phoenix 
Heat Source System, Inc., 948 P.2d 9 (Colo. App. 1997) involved an insurer who, 
after paying the loss, "assigned the town all of its interests, including rights of 
subrogation,...." 948 P.2d at 11. That may explain why nothing was said about the 
insurers endorsing the waiver of subrogation. 
Richmond Steel, Inc. v. Legal and General Assurance Society, Ltd., 821 F. 
Supp. 793 (D. P.R. 1993), another case cited by Voest-Alpine in the court below, is 
interesting because it involved a subrogation action by an insurer in a case where 
the waiver of subrogation required an express insurer endorsement. However, the 
court did not address the issue. 821 F. Supp. at 799-802. There is no way to know 
if the endorsement were made or not. This is true for most of the cases dealing 
with waiver of subrogation. 
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Richmond Steel Inc., supra, is useful for stating the purpose behind a waiver 
of subrogation: "The purpose of a waiver of subrogation...is...to require a party to 
the contract to provide...insurance for all the parties." 821 F. Supp. at 800. In other 
words, the waiver of subrogation walks hand-in-hand with the insurance 
requirement in the parties' contract. 
The purpose behind the waiver is served when the parties obtain the 
insurance required by the contract. It is not served when the parties avoid their 
contractual obligation to supply insurance where one of the parties has supplied 
insurance that is not required by the contract. 
Richmond Steel, Inc., supra, may well illustrate this principle. The case 
involved property damage that was covered by property insurance obtained by the 
owner. The owner's insurer argued that the waiver of subrogation did not apply 
because the party seeking to enforce it (apparently) had not supplied the insurance 
it was required to under the contract. 
The court held that this did not make any difference because the party's 
obligation was to supply "liability" insurance, and the case did not involve a 
liability claim. 821 F. Supp. at 801. It is obvious from what the court said that the 
result may have been different if the case involved a claim covered by liability 
insurance, id., which is just the case here. 
18 
It is clear from the language in |6.4 of the Lease that the waiver of 
subrogation was dependent on the mutual insurance obligation in fflf6.1 and 6.2. 
Voest-Alpine's tortured and syllogistic reading of ]f6.4 actually renders the waiver 
of subrogation moot and unenforceable. 
As demonstrated above, waivers of subrogation serve an important purpose 
of requiring the parties to a contract to obtain insurance to cover their risks and 
then to look to that insurance in case of an accident, loss or damage. That purpose 
would not be served by affirming the Judgment in this case. 
In order to secure the benefits of a waiver of subrogation, this Court should 
make it the law of this State that waivers of subrogation are ineffective unless 
parties to a contract obtain the insurance expressly required by the contract. In that 
case, the interests of justice would be served in this case, and the interests of good 
commerce would be served in all cases. 
III. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR VOEST-ALPINE'S "AMENDED" 
JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
Paragraph 15.13 of the Lease (R. 306) provides the basis for Voest-Alpine's 
request for attorney's fees: "If either party brings an action to enforce the terms 
hereof or declare rights hereunder, the prevailing party shall be entitled to its 
reasonable attorney fees." 
19 
Voest-Alpine submitted an attorney's fee request of $30,206.45 for its Salt 
Lake City law firm. Judge Taylor found that only those fees of the Salt Lake City 
law firm were "reasonable." Accordingly, Judge Taylor awarded that amount to 
Voest-Alpine. 
Voest-Alpine made an error in the calculation of the attorney's fees it 
requested. Even though it supplied Judge Taylor with evidence of attorney's fees 
totaling $38,380.00, it only requested $30,206.45. That was the amount presented 
to Judge Taylor, and that is the amount he found to be "reasonable." 
By serving an Amended Judgment, Voest-Alpine attempted to alter Judge 
Taylor's award without submitting it to him. It does not follow that Judge Taylor 
would have "automatically" awarded the higher amount. That is why Mountain 
States filed Objections to the Amended Judgment. Voest-Alpine's Amended 
Judgment requires a new evaluation by Judge Taylor. 
Mountain States also objected to the request for $4,870.33 in "costs." It is 
important to note that we are not concerned with costs requested under URCP 
54(d). Voest-Alpine has not filed a memorandum of costs under Rule 54(d)(1). 
We are concerned with costs or "legal expenses" requested under the contract of 
the parties. 
20 
There is no provision for an award of costs or legal expenses in the parties' 
contract. Fees provided by contract are only allowed in "strict" accordance with 
the terms of the contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988). Therefore, Voest-Alpine's Amended Judgment should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Both the Lease and common law principles of waiver and estoppel required 
notice to and written endorsements from the parties' insurance carriers expressly 
acknowledging the "Waiver of Subrogation." However, there was no evidence of 
such notice and certainly no such endorsements were made. Therefore, Mountain 
States' liability insurance carriers are free to pursue this action. 
The Waiver of Subrogation was dependent on the mutual insurance 
requirement in the Lease. Both parties were required to obtain different kinds of 
insurance for their mutual benefit. The purpose behind the Waiver of Subrogation 
would not be served by permitting Voest-Alpine to avoid its obligation to provide 
the insurance that would have covered this loss. This would mean that parties in 
other cases could ignore their insurance obligations in cases where the other party 
obtains insurance not required by the parties' contract. 
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There is no basis for the Amended Judgment. Judge Taylor found the sum 
of $30,206.45 to be a "reasonable" attorney's fee. There is no provision in the 
Lease for costs or legal expenses. 
For all the foregoing reasons, Mountain States respectfully requests that the 
Court reverse the Judgment of the trial court. 
DATED this l ^ T d a y of February, 2001. 
DALTON&KELLEY 
\ lw( d)L wJ-w By 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Appellant 
22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THIS WILL CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the Within and 
foregoing "Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this ^v^ r t ay of 
February, 2001, to: 
Terry M. Plant 
Jason M. Ken-
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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Donald L.Dalton (4305) 
DALTON & KELLEY 
Attorneys for Mountain States 
Post Office Box 58084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
Telephone: (801)583-2510 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES STEEL, INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
VOEST-ALPINE SERVICES & 
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, 
Third-Party Defendant. \ 
OBJECTIONS TO VOEST-
ALPINE'S "AMENDED" 
FINDINGS OF FACT; 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: 
ATTORNEY'S FEES; COSTS 
Case No. 960400135 PI 
Hon. James R. Taylor 
Mountain States Steel, Inc., by and through its attorneys, respectfully submits the 
following Objections to Voest-Alpine's "Amended" Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law 
Re: Attorney's Fees; Costs: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On June 19,2000, Voest-Alpine Services & Technologies Corporation 
made a Motion for Attorney's Fees. 
2. There was a Memorandum in Support in which Voest-Alpine detailed its 
claim for attorney's fees as $30,206.45 to the Salt Lake City law firm Plant, 
Wallace, Christensen & Kanell and $23,637.50 to the Pittsburgh law firm 
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart. 
3* The Motion was based on f 15.13 of the Lease, which provides: "If either 
party brings an action to enforce the terms hereof or declare rights 
hereunder, the prevailing party shall be entitled to its reasonable attorney 
fees." 
4. There is no provision in the Lease for an award of "costs" or legal expenses. 
5. The Court considered the objections of Mountain States and in a 
Memorandum Decision re Attorney's Fees, ruled that "$30,206.45," the 
amount represented to have been billed by Plant, Wallace, Christensen & 
Kanell, "represents a reasonable fee incurred in the defense of the third 
party action maintained by [Mountain States] in this case." Pg. 3 of 5 
6. Based on this finding, the Court concluded that "Voest-Alpine is entitled to 
attorneys fees and costs reasonably incurred in this matter of $30,206.45." 
Pg.4of5 
7. On September 19,2000, Voest-Alpine submitted Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment for Third-Party Defendant 
Voest-Alpine's Attorney's Fees. 
8. Paragraph 10 of the Findings and Conclusions correctly stated the amount 
of the Court's award as "$30,206.45." 
9. Mountain States made no objection to the Findings and Conclusions or 
Judgment because they were consistent with the Court's Memorandum 
Decision. 
10. Though the time has passed, Voest-Alpine has (apparently) not submitted 
the Findings and Conclusion or Judgment to the Court. 
11. Instead, on October 9,2000, Voest-Alpine submitted "Amended" Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
12. Paragraph 10 of the Findings and Conclusions reads as follows: "This 
Court finds that defendant Voest-Alpine Services and Technologies is 
entitled to its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter in 
the amount of $43.250.33." 
13. The difference in amounts is explained nowhere in the Findings and 
Conclusions or Judgment. 
14. However, in a letter dated October 9,2000, Voest-Alpine explained: "Due 
to an arithmetic error, our motion and first proposed judgment has incorrect 
amounts listed as the total fees and costs expended by Voest-Alpine in this 
matter. The correct total amount for Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell 
from all the bills submitted with the affidavit was $38.380.00 in attorney's 
fees and $4.870.33 in costs." 
15. $43,250.33 represents the sum of the represented $38,380.00 in attorney's 
fees and $4,870.33 in costs. 
ARGUMENTS 
The award of the Court was $30,206.45. This was based on the representation of 
Voest-Alpine that its fees from Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell were $30,206.45: 
"The total bill from that firm, of $30,206.45, represents a reasonable fee incurred in the 
defense of the third party action maintained by [Mountain States] in this case. 
Memorandum Decision, pg. 3 of 5 
Based on this same representation, Mountain States, in its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Voest-Alpine's Motion for Attorney's Fees, reached the same conclusion: 
"If there is to be a recovery it should be limited to what was billed and actually paid by 
Voest-Alpine to the Utah law firm." Pg. 3 
Paragraph 10 of the "Amended" Findings of Fact and Conclusions misstates the 
Court's ruling on the matter. It states that Voest-Alpine is entitled to "its reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter in the amount of $43,250.33." This was 
not the finding or conclusion of the Court and should not have been stated as such. 
If Voest-Alpine insists on the higher amount, Mountain States should be permitted 
to re-evaluate the request, taking a closer look at the actual time charges from Plant, 
Wallace, Christensen & Kanell. $30,206.45 may have been a reasonable amount: 
$38,380,00 may not 
In any event, there is no basis for an award of "costs." What Voest-Alpine really 
means is "expenses," and there is no provision for expenses in the parties' agreement. 
listed DATED this l y f o y of October, 2000. 
DALTON&KELLEY 
Byj(L^L\Ckfa^ 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Mountain States 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THIS WILL CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing "Objections" to be mailed, postage prepaid, this lg*v*a,ay of October, 2000 to 3W
Terry M. Plant 
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
l[W&fil\_ftjjk^ 
TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
JASON M. KERR, #8222 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants Voest-Alpine 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK BAKOWSKI, 
Plaintiff, 
V • 
MOUNTAIN STATES STEEL, INC. 
GROVE MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY; GROVE WORLDWIDE, 
INC.; NATIONAL CRANE CORP., 
INC; and JOHN DOES I 
THROUGH IV, 
Defendants. 
MOUNTAIN STATES STEEL, 
INC., ; 
Defendant & Third-Party ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
VOEST-ALPINE SERVICES & ; 
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, a ) 
Delaware corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
) JUDGMENT FOR THIRD-PARTY 
) DEFENDANT VOEST-ALPINE'S 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) Civil No. 960400135 PI 
l Judge JAMES TAYLOR 
The Court, having determined that third-party defendant Voest-
Alpine Services and Technology is the prevailing party in the above 
entitled lawsuit and that Voest-Alpine is entitled to its attorney's 
fees as per the findings of fact and conclusion of law dated , 
which are incorporated into this order by this reference. It is 
ordered and adjudged that third-party defendant Voest-Alpine 
Services and Technologies Corporation recover from third-party 
plaintiff Mountain States Steel, Inc. $43,250.33 as reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs. 
Dated this day of September, 2000. 
By the Court: 
JAMES R. TAYLOR 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed, postage prepaid, this day of 
September, 2 000, to the following: 
Attorneys for Mountain States 
Donald L. Dalton 
DALTON & KELLEY 
P0 Box 58084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
